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ARTICLES
COMPLIANCE PLANNING FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES
RAY K. HARRISt
JAMES D. BURGESStt
Infringement of intellectual property rights is not exclusively an
issue for civil litigation. Increasingly, criminal law sanctions are avail-
able at both the federal and state level to deter intellectual property
infringement.' The Department of Justice has published an IP crime
prosecution manual addressing federal enforcement efforts.2
Two recent cases have drawn attention to the criminal law aspects
of infringement of intellectual property rights:
tt Ray K. Harris is a Director at Fennemore Craig, P.C. in Phoenix, Arizona, and chairs
its intellectual property practice. He is involved in commercial litigation, including intel-
lectual property protection. He is a past chair of the Intellectual Property Section of the
Arizona State Bar and a current Director of the Arizona Technology Council and the
GSPED High Technology Industry Cluster. He is a graduate of the University of Arizona
and its Law School, where he was Order of the Coif and Executive Editor of the Law
Review.
t James D. Burgess is a Director at Fennemore Craig, P.C. in Phoenix, Arizona, and
practices primarily business litigation and corporate compliance planning. He has devel-
oped compliance programs for companies in the high-tech, health care and manufacturing
industries.
1 In November 2001, the Council of Europe promulgated a cybercrime treaty signed
by the United States. See infra note 159. Thus international law also recognizes criminal
sanctions.
2 David Goldstone, Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes Manual, Computer Crime
and Intellectual Property Section (Jan. 2001), http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual.htm.
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*a Russian software developer, Demitry Sklyarov, and his em-
ployer, ElcomSoft, were federally indicted for circumventing e-book
copyright protection technology in violation of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.3
oAvant! Corporation was ordered to pay $195 million in restitu-
tion to Cadence Designs Systems, plus a $30 million fine, for trade
secret theft under California law.4
In both examples, potential corporate criminal liability arose
from violations of intellectual property rights by employees. 5 Con-
gress and the courts are imposing criminal sanctions with greater fre-
quency to protect intellectual property from misappropriation by
competitors, former employees and hackers.
This article examines the criminal sanctions applicable to intellec-
tual property infringement (trademarks, trade secrets and copyrights)
and provides examples of reported criminal prosecutions. Corporate
compliance planning is recommended to mitigate the risk of prosecu-
tion for intellectual property crimes.
3 See infra note 160 et seq.
4 See infra note 81 et seq.
5 Related statutes offer some expanded protection for commercially sensitive and pro-
prietary information. The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 (PL
104-294) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1996 criminalize unauthorized, inten-
tional computer access resulting in damages. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(5)(B). See United
States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2000); America OnLine, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc.,
46 F.Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) (civil liability under state and federal computer crimes
laws); Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (civil liability for unauthorized use of computer system to e-mail trade
secrets to competitor). The potential criminal liability under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., M. Levinson & C. Paetsch, The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Powerful New Way to Protect Information, 19 COM-
PUTER & INTERNET LAWYER 11 (Sept. 2002).
This article also does not address the sale and export of encryption products commer-
cially available overseas. Encryption software was regulated by the Department of State,
and now by the Department of Commerce, as munitions. Exportation is limited by regula-
tion. In 1997, a District Court in San Francisco held the regulations violate the First
Amendment right to free speech. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 974 F.Supp. 1288 (N.D.
Cal. 1997), affd, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) reh'g. granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999)
Accord Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). Another District Court had previ-
ously ruled the regulations did not violate free speech. Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), remanded 107 F.3d. 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In response the Clinton
administration expanded the definition of encryption software eligible for exportation. 65
FR 2492 (2000).
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I.
CRIMINAL PENALTIES APPLY FOR MISUSE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. Trademark Infringement
A trademark is any word, symbol or device that identifies the
source of goods and distinguishes those goods from competitors'
goods.6 Examples include: Coca Cola® (U.S. Reg. No. 22,406);
Microsoft® (U.S. Reg. No. 1,200,236); and the Nike swoosh design
(U.S. Reg. No. 977,190). Trademarks arise at common law from use
with the goods and can be registered under either federal or state law,
or both.7 Trademarks are protected under common law without any
registration. 8 The first person to use a trademark has the common law
right to prevent use of a similar mark by a competitor that is likely to
cause confusion in the marketplace. 9
To avoid infringement, it is common to conduct clearance
searches to identify any similar registered or unregistered marks
before adopting new trademarks. 10 Statutory trademark damages are
available as civil damages in counterfeiting cases. 1
Trademark protection prevents competitors from confusing cus-
tomers by their misuse of the name of a successful company or prod-
uct.12 Trademark protection generally requires proof: (1) the mark
identifies a single source of goods; and (2) a competitor's use of a
colorable imitation 13 confuses customers.14 A trademark holder's rep-
6 15 U.S.C. § 1127, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1441(a)(7); Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition § 9. "A service mark is a trademark that is used in connection with services."
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9. In January 1995, the American Law Insti-
tute published The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. The Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition represents the only restatement of the law of unfair competition since
1939. Sections 9-31 deal with trademarks.
7 15 U.S.C. § 1051; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1442.
8 15 U.S.C. § 1125, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1452. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition § 19 (priority of rights based on use).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1065, 1115(b)(5); Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut,
Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1969). ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1451(A); Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 20.
10 See, e.g., Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d
66 (2d Cir. 1998).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) ($500-1,000,000 per mark).
12 Trademark law protects both consumers (who can rely on trademarks to identify
efficiently the product they want) and trademark owners (who can prevent piracy of their
investment in reputation). See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
773, reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1244 (1992); Mana Products, Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg.,
Inc., 65 F.3d 1063, 1068 (2nd Cir. 1995); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d
654, 657-658 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996).
13 See, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. "Counterfeit" marks are distinguished from colorable imita-
tions, and are subject to enhanced sanctions, including criminal sanctions. 15 U.S.C.
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utation is harmed when potential purchasers of its goods see
unauthentic goods using the trademark and identify these counterfeit
goods with the trademark holder. 15
1. Prosecution Under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984
Since 1984, knowingly using a counterfeit mark with intent to
traffic in goods or services can result in criminal liability.16 In the last
four years, approximately a dozen cases have been prosecuted for
trademark counterfeiting. 17 In a 1998 case, sales of counterfeit mem-
ory chips and boards in IBM boxes lead to $3.3 million in fines and
restitution. 18 The $2.2 million fine was "one of the largest ever for a
criminal trademark case". 19
Criminal liability requires proof of use of a counterfeit mark. A
counterfeit mark is "a spurious mark (i) that is used in connection
with trafficking in goods or services; (ii) that is identical with, or sub-
stantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered for those goods or
services ... ; and (iii) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to
cause mistake, or to deceived. '20
§ 1116(d). See also Too, Inc. v. TJX Companies, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S. D. Ohio
2002).
14 See, Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, §§ 9, 20; 1 McCarthy, TRADEMARKS
& UNFAIR COMPETITION, §§ 3:3, 23:1 (4th Ed. 1997); 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a); Petro Shop-
ping Centers, L.P. v. James River Petroleum, Inc., 130 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1997). Registra-
tion is prima facia evidence of the validity of the mark and plaintiff's exclusive right to use
the mark in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). Civil remedies for
trademark infringement include injunctive relief (15 U.S.C. § 1116), damages (15 U.S.C.
§ 1117) and attorneys fees "in exceptional cases" (15 U.S.C. § 1117).
15 U.S. v. Hanafy, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1024 (N.D. Tex. 2000), affd 302 F.2d 485 (5th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis
added) (quoted approvingly by United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1989)).
The "post sale confusion doctrine" established in federal trademark law recognizes that
trademark protection extends to future consumers. See, e.g., Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d
1235 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992); 3 McCarthy, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:7. Thus it is not a defense to liability (including criminal liabil-
ity) that the counterfeiter disclosed the products were fake to the initial buyer. State v.
Marchiani, 336 N.J. Super. 541, 765 A.2d 765 (2001).
16 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a). Criminal liability can also be imposed for trafficking in counter-
feit labels, computer programs, documentation or packaging, or motion pictures. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2318.
17 http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipcases.htm (chart of cases).
18 Violation of IBM Trademark Results in $3.3 Million Fine and Restitution for Chicago
Area Company, http://www.cybercrime.gov/desktop.htm.
19 Id.
20 18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1)(A). See United States v. Petrosian, 126 F.3d 1232, 1234 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1138 (1998). U.S. v. Hanafy, 124 F. Supp. 2d, 1016, 1022
(N.D. Tx. 2000), aff'd 302 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Sultan, 115 F.3d 321, 325
(5th Cir. 1997).
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A "spurious mark" is "one that is false or inauthentic". 21 In or-
der to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a), the government must
establish that: (1) the defendant trafficked or attempted to traffic in
goods or services; (2) such trafficking, or the attempt to traffic, was
intentional; (3) the defendant used a counterfeit mark on or in con-
nection with such goods or services; and (4) the defendant knew that
the mark so used was counterfeit. 22
In addition to an infringement under the ordinary standard of
trademark infringement, criminal trademark counterfeiting requires
use of a counterfeit mark registered on the principal register. 23 Crimi-
nal liability can only occur "if a spurious mark is used on or in connec-
tion with goods or services for which the genuine mark is actually
registered ... and is in use."'24
The legislative history indicates that this 1984 legislation was in-
tended to "help stem... an 'epidemic' of commercial counterfeiting"
by providing "stiff criminal penalties for those who intentionally traf-
fic in goods or services knowing them to be counterfeit. ' 25 One court
has suggested, "Congress intended to criminalize all of the conduct for
which an individual may be civilly liable. '26 Thus, in U.S. v. Petrosian,
sale of a generic cola under the "Coca Cola" trademark (use of a gen-
uine trademark affixed to a counterfeit product) lead to a criminal
conviction under the statutes prohibiting use of a counterfeit mark. 27
Not all courts agree, however, that every violation of trademark
law constitutes criminal conduct. In July 2000, $1.9 million in cash was
forfeited and four defendants were convicted for selling counterfeit
21 U.S. v. Petrosian, 126 F.3d at 1234.
22 U.S. v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Sultan, 115 F.3d
321, 325 (5th Cir. 1997).
23 J. DRATLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY § 11.09(4) (1999).
24 S. Rep. No. 526, at 10 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3636; U.S. v.
Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2000).
25 S. REP. No. 98-526 at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News
3627, 3631. In 1996, Congress enhanced civil and criminal penalties for infringing copy-
rights and trademarks. Penalties can include fines up to $2 million and imprisonment for
up to 10 years for individuals and fines up to $5 million for other legal entities. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(a). Individual repeat offenders can be fined up to $5 million and imprisoned up to
20 years and entities can be fined up to $15 million. Id. Trafficking in counterfeit goods is
also now a predicate act under the RICO statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The predicate act
provision can not be applied retroactively. Snowden v. Lexmark Int'l Inc., 237 F.3d 620
(6th Cir. 2001).
26 U. S. v. Petrosian, 126 F.3d 1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied., 522 U.S. 1138
(1998).
27 U. S. v. Petrosian, 126 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1997). See also U.S. v. Cho, 136 F.3d 982
(5th Cir. 1998)(retail value governs sentencing guidelines).
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Enfamil infant formula.28 The District Court Judge subsequently held
the mark was not counterfeit because the goods were genuine and
granted a motion for acquittal. 29 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Repack-
aging genuine goods, even though actionable under civil trademark
law,30 is not criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 2320.31
As a criminal statute, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act must be
construed narrowly. 32 However, a criminal statute must also be inter-
preted to accomplish its legislative purposes. 33 Even construed nar-
rowly, however, the risk of prosecution remains.
2. Prosecution Under State Trademark Law
State law also prohibits use of counterfeit trademarks.34 Arizona
law, for example, recognized the possible imposition of criminal liabil-
ity for sale of counterfeit goods.35 In 1998, the Arizona legislature
enhanced criminal penalties for the use of counterfeit marks. 36 The
statutory elements are: (1) "knowingly and with intent to sell or dis-
tribute"; and (2) distributing "any item that bears a counterfeit
mark". 37 An injured person may file an action for recovery of up to
28 Federal Jury Convicts Four Individuals on Charges of Trademark Counterfeit Con-
spiracy for Reselling Infant Formula, http://www.cybercrime.gov/babyfood.htm. Conspir-
acy to sell counterfeit Similac baby formula lead to a recent conviction in another well
publicized case. Fugitive Who Sold Counterfeit Baby Formula Convicted of Federal Crimi-
nal Charges, http://www.cybercrime.gov/mostafaConvict.htm.
29 U.S. v. Hanafy, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Tex. 2000), aff'd, 203 F.3d 485 (5th Cir.
2002).
30 See Prestonettes Inc. v. Coty, 266 U.S. 359 (1924) (repackaging must be disclosed on
label); Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco, Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998); Monsanto
Corp. v. Heskel Trading, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 349, 356-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
31 U.S. v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2002).
32 Id.; U.S. v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (trafficking in counterfeit labels
unattached to goods is not prohibited by law).
33 State v. Marchiani, 336 N.J. Super. 541, 545, 765 A.2d 765, 767 (2001).
34 See, e.g., State v. Marchiani, 336 N.J. Super. 541, 765 A.2d 765 (2001); Nazemi v.
Texas, 28 S.W.3d 806 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2000).
35 Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 44-1453 (2002). A Georgia statute attempting to criminalize use of
trade names or logos as misleading e-mail addresses or hyperlinks was struck down under
the First Amendment. American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Miller, 977 F. Supp.
1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997). The use of trademarks on the Internet, however, may continue to
elicit punitive legislation.
36 Knowingly possessing or advertising an item bearing a counterfeit mark with intent
to sell or distribute is a class 1 misdemeanor, and is a felony if the person has a previous
conviction for counterfeiting or the value of the counterfeit goods is greater than $1,000.
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 44-1453 (2002). Knowingly using computer software that displays a
counterfeit state registered mark for commercial purposes is a class 5 felony. Id. § 44-1455.
Penalties can range from probation to 2 1/2 years in prison and a $150,000 fine.
37 Id. § 44-1453(A). Common law unfair competition may be established by proof that
the defendants engaged in deceptive practices causing confusion to the ordinary consumer.
Wright v. Palmer, 11 Ariz. App. 292, 464 P.2d 363 (1970); Taylor v. Quebedaux, 617 P.2d
23, 24 (Ariz. 1980).
COMPLIANCE PLANNING FOR IP CRIMES
treble damages and the cost of suit-including reasonable attorneys
fees.38 Prior registration of intellectual property rights also gives the
owner the benefit of various statutory presumptions. 39 The court may
order restitution to the intellectual property owner. 40
Soon after the changes in Arizona law took effect, sale of coun-
terfeit software and apparel lead to well publicized prosecutions. 41
Arizona also created a cause of action for trademark infringe-
ment against any person who distributes or uses an unauthorized copy
of computer software, knowing it to be an unauthorized copy, if it
displays a trademark registered in Arizona.42 This provision has not
yet been tested in the courts.
B. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
Unlike trademark protection, which can arise under either fed-
eral or state law, trade secret protection has traditionally been a mat-
ter of state law alone. The classic example of a trade secret is the
formula for Coke®. Typically, at least some employees must be given
access to confidential, proprietary information. Because employment
is increasingly transitory, proprietary information must be protected
from disclosure to subsequent employers. Trade secret laws attempt
to balance protection of the employer's proprietary information with
utilization of the employee's training and experience. 43 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court will have to balance First Amendment rights in a
case holding an injunction against disclosure of a trade secret (DVD
decryption technology) as an impermissible prior restraint on
speech. 44
38 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1453(J).
39 Id. §§ 44-1444(B) (2002) (proof of state trademark registration), 1453(I) (facts stated
in certificate of registration).
40 Id. § 44-1453(F). Counterfeiting trademarks is a predicate offense under the Ari-
zona RICO statute. Id. § 13-2301(D)(4)(bb) (2000). A single act will suffice to establish a
pattern of activity. Id. § 13-2314.04(S)(3)(b).
41 Judi Villa, Raid Targets Software Sellers, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1998, at B1;
Brent Whiting, Vendor Accused of Sales of Counterfeit Products Police Seize Articles
Stamped With bogus Labels, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Dec. 23, 1998, at 1.
42 The legislation also makes the unauthorized use, removal or alteration of a software
trademark, with the intent to deceive, a trademark infringement. The definition of in-
fringement is modified to more closely parallel federal law. Cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1451(A)(1) (West 2003) and 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West 2003).
43 See Amex Distributing Co., Inc. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596, 602 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 42, cmt. b (1995). Generally, al-
though the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition employs its own terminology, the
principles established are consistent with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Sections 39-45
address trade secret law.
44 DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. Bunner, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 338, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001),
review granted 117 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
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Arizona has adopted the Uniform Trade Secret Act definition of
a trade secret as proprietary information, which (1) derives indepen-
dent economic value, actual or potential, as a result of not being gen-
erally known or ascertainable; and (2) is subject to reasonable efforts
to maintain secrecy. 4 5 Trade secret protection applies to formulas,
patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods, techniques or
processes which give a company a competitive advantage because they
are not generally known.46
While no specific set of security measures is mandated, trade
secrets must be subject to "reasonable efforts" to maintain secrecy.47
"[R]easonable efforts to maintain secrecy have been held to include
advising employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting access
to a trade secret on 'need to know basis', and controlling plant ac-
cess."148 What is reasonable varies with the circumstances of each
case, but, generally: physical access should be strictly limited; nonem-
ployee access should be prohibited; proprietary statements should ap-
pear on all copies of confidential material; employees should be
required to sign confidentiality agreements49 and participate in exit
interviews; employment manuals should describe material that is pro-
prietary and confidential; and licenses should acknowledge that the
material is proprietary and confidential, contain covenants against dis-
45 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-401(4) (West 2003). The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition defines a trade secret as "any information that can be used in the operation of
a business enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 39 (1995). "The concept of a trade secret as defined in this Section is intended to be
consistent with" the Uniform Trade Secret Act. Id. at cmt. b.
46 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-401. Trade secrets include: strategic plans; product de-
velopment materials; internal financial records; lists of key suppliers or employees; pro-
grams; methods; techniques; processes and know-how. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Pochiro, 736 P.2d 1180, 1183 (App. 1987) (customer list); Morton v. Rogers, 514 P.2d 752,
756 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (formula for cleaning solutions). Enterprise Leasing Co. of
Phoenix v. Ehmke, 3 P.3d 1064 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (financial records and expansion
plans. Components of the trade secret may be in the public domain as long as the combi-
nation is not generally known and yields a competitive advantage as a result. Tracer Re-
search Corp. v. National Environmental Services, Inc., 843 F.Supp. 568, 582 (D. Ariz.
1993).
47 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-401(4)(b) (West 2003). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39, cmt. g (1995) ("precautions to maintain secrecy may take
many forms"). 1 ROBERT MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS §1.04 (1995); Rockwell Graphic Sys-
tems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991); Electro-Craft Corp. v.
Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983).
48 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt.
49 Confidentiality agreements can be critical in establishing reasonable efforts to main-
tain secrecy. For example, an engineer who agreed to "forever keep secret" the employer's
source code was recently sentenced to 2 years in prison after offering the software over the
Internet. Former Engineer of White Plains Software Company Receives Two Years in
Prison for Theft of Trade Secret, at www.cybercrime.gov/kissaneSent.htm.
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closure, copying or reverse engineering, and require return of material
upon termination.50
Misappropriation of a trade secret exposes the wrongdoer to in-
junctive relief and damages. 51 Misappropriation is acquisition or dis-
closure of secret information by improper means.52 Improper means
include: "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy or espionage. '' 53 The most com-
mon form of misappropriation, of course, results from hiring former
employees with knowledge of the trade secret.54 If a former employee
goes to work for a competitor, the former employee and the competi-
tor often receive a letter stating that the former employee had access
to trade secrets and is under an obligation not to disclose those trade
secrets in his new employment. One consequence of such a letter is
the new employer may be sued as a joint tortfeasor for trade secret
misappropriation. 55
50 See, e.g., Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 825 F.Supp. 340,
359 (D. Mass. 1993), affd in part, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Avtec Systems, Inc. v.
Peiffer, 805 F.Supp. 1312 (E.D. Va. 1992), modified, 21 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 1994).
51 A.R.S. §§ 44-402, 403.
52 A.R.S. § 44-401(2).
53 A.R.S. § 44-401(1). See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 43 (1995);
Chanay v. Chittendon, 115 Ariz. 32, 38, 563 P.2d 287, 293 (1977) (actual theft is "just one of
the many improper means by which the disclosure, use or procurement might take place").
54 See, e.g., Economy Roofing & Insulating Co. v. Zumaris, 538 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa
1995). Cf Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Service Co., 843 F.Supp. 568
(D. Ariz. 1993) (former licensee). Misappropriation need not involve physical copying. A
trade secret can be misappropriated by memory. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dism'd, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994); Ed Nowogroski Ins.,
Inc. v. Rucker, 88 Wash. App. 350, 944 P.2d 1093 (Wash. App. 1997); review granted, 958
P.2d 313 (1998) affd, 971 P.2d 936 (1999); Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 272 I11.
App.3d 580, 209 Ill. Dec. 281, 651 N.E.2d 209 (1995), app. denied, 657 N.E.2d 639 (1995).
55 A.R.S. §§ 44-401(2)(B)(i), 402(B); Uniform Act § 2, Commissioners' Comment
("The notice suffices to make the third party a misappropriator thereafter .. "); Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 40(b)(3), comment d and reporters' note ("letters
and other communications sent to the defendant by the trade secret owner can establish
that the defendant knew its use or disclosure was wrongful"); Salsbury Laboratories, Inc.
v. Merieux Laboratories, Inc., 908 F.2d 706, 713 (11th Cir. 1990); Conmar Products Corp.
v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1949). IDS Life Ins. Co. v.
SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F.Supp. 1258 (N.D. II. 1997), afjd in part, 136 F.3d 537 (7th Cir.
1998). See Uniform Act § 3, Commissioners' Comment (If a person materially changes
position without knowledge of misappropriation, damages "should not be awarded for past
conduct that occurred prior to notice that a misappropriated trade secret has been ac-
quired"). Cf. A.R.S. § 44-402(B) (injunction may also be denied after change of position
prior to notice of misappropriation). An employer need not have actual notice of an em-
ployee's violation of trade secrets of a competitor. Constructive notice is sufficient. Com-
puter Associates Intern., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2nd Cir. 1992).
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1. Prosecution Under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
The Economic Espionage Act ("EEA") criminalizes theft of
trade secrets. 56 The EEA created federal protection for property pre-
viously protected only by state law. The legislative history states the
EEA covers conduct as diverse as stealing competitor's bid proposals
or leaving employment with computerized engineering schematics. 57
Since October 1996, theft, attempted theft, or conspiracy to steal trade
secrets from an owner or licensee subjects defendants to federal
prosecution. 58
The EEA has separate provisions governing foreign espionage59
and domestic trade secret theft. 60 For domestic theft:
(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related
to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in
interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of an-
yone other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing
that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret,
knowingly
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, car-
ries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception
obtains such information;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photo-
copies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, com-
municates, or conveys such information;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing
the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained,
or converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs
(1) through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any
offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one
or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in subsection
(b), be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both.
(b) Any organization that commits any offense described in sub-
section (a) shall be fined not more than $5,000,000.61
56 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000) (effective Oct. 11, 1996).
57 H.R. Rep. No. 104-778 (1996).
58 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (imposing fines of up to $250,000 [up to $5 million for organiza-
tions] and imprisonment for up to 10 years).
59 18 U.S.C. § 1831.
60 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
61 Id.
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The definition of a trade secret is arguably broader in the EEA
than under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.62 The EEA recognizes a
trade secret if: (a) the owner thereof has taken responsible measures
to keep such information secret; and (b) the information derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being gen-
erally known to, or not being readily ascertainable through proper
means by, the public ... 63
The EEA protects:
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, eco-
nomic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compi-
lations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tan-
gible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memo-
rialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or
in writing.64
There is no minimum jurisdictional value.
The prospect of tax dollars funding litigation with a misap-
propriator is appealing and the federal law provides for protection of
trade secrets during prosecution. 65 Forfeiture of property and profits
earned is also provided. 66
There is a loss of control of the federal prosecution, however, and
a potential loss of control of the underlying trade secrets. In U.S. v.
Hsu,6 7 the District Court denied a strong protective order for Bristol-
Myers trade secrets. The court concluded the defendant's constitu-
tional right to access the incriminating evidence is paramount. The
Third Circuit reversed, thereby providing some comfort to trade se-
cret owners, but only because the crimes charged-attempt and con-
spiracy-do not require the existence of actual trade secrets.68
62 G. Dilworth, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: An Overview, U.S. ATTORNEYS
BULLETIN (May 2001) available at vww.cybercrime.gov/usamay2001 6.htm; See U.S. v.
Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 11 (1st. Cir. 2000).
63 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
64 Id.
65 18 U.S.C. § 1835.
66 18 U.S.C. § 1834.
67 982 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997), reversed 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
68 155 F.3d 189 (3d. Cir. 1998).
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Federal prosecutions have been pursued in connection with tech-
nologies owned by a range of companies. 69 Approximately 35 cases
have been brought under the Economic Espionage Act.70
In United States v. Martin, a classic example of bumbling theft,
conspiratorial e-mail was inadvertently distributed to other employees
of the victim. 71 The co-conspirator (who entered into a plea agree-
ment in return for testimony against the defendant) sent a series of e-
mail acknowledging "I feel like a spy", "they know I've been stealing,
so to speak, from the company in sending info to someone" and re-
ceived encouragement to "absorb as much information, physically and
intellectually, as you can."' 72 The court upheld the conviction under
the Economic Espionage Act, "which applies to attempts or conspira-
cies to steal trade secrets. ' 73 A reasonable jury could conclude that
the co-conspirator had formed an agreement to convey information to
the defendant in violation of the statute.
A careful reading of the 7-month e-mail communication between
Dr. Steven Martin and Karyn Camp could lead to the conclusion
that Martin and his counsel urge-that this is simply a pen-pal rela-
tionship between a lonely Maine lab technician and a reclusive Cali-
fornia scientist. However, the evidence could also lead a reader to
the conclusion that something far more sinister was afoot: that an
originally harmless communication mushroomed into a conspiracy
to steal trade secrets and transport stolen property interstate, and
that the electronic mail and U.S. mails were used to further a
scheme to defraud IDEXX. Because we find there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude the later beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, we affirm the defendant's conviction on all counts.74
Dr. Martin served about 1 year in prison (January to November
2000) .75
69 See, e.g., E. Herman, Kodak Under Cover, CORP. COUNSEL MAGAZINE, (Dec., 1997)
at 53, 62; D. Osborne, Trading Secrets, AM LAW TECH, (Winter, 1998) at 45; Protecting
Trade Secrets Requires Many Approaches, CORP. LEGAL TIMES (Oct., 1998); R. Deger,
Grand Jury Indicts Avant Executives, THE RECORDER (Dec. 18, 1998), J.D. Mason, G.
Mossinghoff & D. Oblon, The Economic Espionage Act: Federal Protection for Corporate
Trade Secrets 16 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 14 (March 1999). Hosteny & Kamp, Corporate
Espionage: Protecting Trade Secrets, ACCA DOCKET (Jan./Feb. 1999) at 18.
70 V. Slind-Flor, Trade Secrets in the Age of Terrorism, IP WORLDWIDE at 12 (July
2002); www.cybercrime.gov/eeapub.htm (chart of cases). For the first five years (until Oc-
tober 2001) every prosecution had to be approved by the Department of Justice. 28 CFR
§ 50.64-5; U.S. Attorney's Manual § 9-59-100 (Sept. 1997).
71 228 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).
72 Id. at 10
73 228 F.3d at 10-11.
74 228 F.3d at 19.
75 P. Toni, Perils of E-Mail, at http://abcnews.go.com/sectionsbusinessfrechTV/techtv_
emailespionage020327.html.
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In U.S. v. Yang 7 6 the defendants were also convicted based upon
the testimony of a co-conspirator cooperating with the prosecution.
The misconduct was originally disclosed by an employee of the defen-
dants seeking employment from the victim. On appeal the imposition
of the maximum fine against the defendant corporation ($5 million)
was vacated. 77 In addition to the criminal prosecution, a civil action
was filed by the victim. The court in the civil action reportedly froze
the assets of the defendants. After the criminal conviction, the victim,
Avery Denison, reportedly obtained a civil judgment of $10 million
for misappropriation of trade secrets and $30 million in punitive
damages. 78
Thus, criminal and civil sanctions can be substantial.
2. Prosecution Under State Law
Arizona has not criminalized trade secret misappropriation as
such.79 At least 17 states do have Criminal Code provisions referring
to theft of trade secrets, including California. 80
The California courts have considered several state law trade se-
cret prosecutions. Cadence Design Systems, Inc. ("Cadence")
claimed trade secret misappropriation by Avant! Corp. . Cadence
pursued a civil action against Avant! while the Santa Clara County
district attorney pursued a parallel state criminal complaint. 81 Con-
troversy ensued over the role of the victim in assisting the prosecu-
tion.82 The criminal action was resolved after four years with guilty
76 74 F. Supp.2d 724 (N.D. Ohio 1999), aff'd in part vacated in part, 281 F.3d 534 (6th
Cir. 2002).
77 Id.
78 James Repass, Michael McCoy, The Economic Espionage Act: How Companies Can
Use it on the Offensive, 7 THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIST, 1, 3 (Dec. 2000).
79 ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1801 (B) 2003 (Liability . . .theft). §13-2310 (a
scheme or articulate to defraud), § 13-2316 (A), (E) (or computer fraud). §13-105(32)
(Protection extends to intellectual property). §13-2301(D)(4)(v), (xx) (Theft ... statute).
80 DRATLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE & INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY, § 13.04(3)(c); CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (1999).
81 See Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S.Ct. 1795 (1998), after remand, 189 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 1999) (table), question
certified to Cal S. Ct., 253 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2001).
82 The California Supreme Court had previously dismissed a state indictment because
of the involvement of the victim in providing expert testimony and financial support to the
prosecution. People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310 (1997). But see IBM Corp. v. Brown, 857 F.
Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1994). In U.S. v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 545 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth
Circuit noted Avery made available to the prosecutors "the same loss evaluation experts
Avery intended to use in the parallel civil case." This participation was "wholly irrelevant
to either the defendant's guilt or the nature or extent of his sentence" and consideration of
the victim's participation was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 546.
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plea, payment of fines totaling over $30 million and restitution to Ca-
dence totaling $195 million. 83
In an opinion ordered not officially published, the California
Court of Appeals reversed a conviction of misappropriating a trade
secret under California State Law, Penal Code Section 499c. The
technology was circuitry for an electronic testing device. The prosecu-
tion was based on a "crumbled paper containing a... simplified block
diagram of the IQ modulator". The definitions of trade secret in the
penal code and civil code are identical. 84 The court found there was
no evidence that the technology derived value from its secrecy. 85 The
court also found that there was no specific intent to deprive the owner
of the trade's secret value for personal gain or competitive advan-
tage.86 The defendant used the diagram in a job interview with a com-
pany that did not compete with his former employer.87
California has also ruled that theft of trade secrets worth more
than $50,000 triggers a minimum sentence statute requiring at least 90
days in County jail as a condition of probation. 88 Therefore, an engi-
neer employed at Digital Equipment Corporation was required to
serve the minimum sentence upon pleading guilty to theft of trade
secrets in an amount exceeding $100,000. The court noted that the
purpose of the minimum sentence statute was to vigorously prosecute
white-collar crime and ensure restitution to victims. Those purposes
would not be served by excluding theft of property that had substan-
tial value, but was not cash or a cash equivalent.
C. Copyright Infringement
Copyright protection, unlike trade secrets or trademarks, is exclu-
sively the province of federal law.89 Copyright protection exists for
any "original works of authorship" reduced to a tangible form.90 The
copyright owner has the exclusive right: (1) to reproduce the work,
(2) to prepare derivative works, (3) to distribute copies to the public,
(4) to perform the work publicly, and (5) to display the work pub-
83 Victoria Slind-Flor, Did Cadence Get Short-Changed in Criminal Trade Secrets Case?
IP WORLDWIDE (Oct. 2001); Shannon Lafferty, Avant Success May Give Prosecutor Am-
munition in Trade Secrets Case, THE RECORDER, May 23, 2001, at 1.
84 People v. Hsieh, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 56 n.4 (Ct. App. 2000). Compare Cal. Civil
Code § 3426.1(d) and Cal. Penal Code § 499c(a)(9). Both conform to the definition in the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Hsieh, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55 n.4.
85 Id. at 58.
86 Id. at 60-61.
87 People v. Hsieh, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 51 (Ct. App. 2000).
88 Penal Code § 1203.044 (People v. Farell, 28 Cal. 4th 381, 384 (2002)).
89 See infra note 160.
90 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
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licly.91 The software, music and movie industries rely heavily on copy-
right protection of their intellectual property.
The elements of a prima facie case for copyright infringement are:
(1) Ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) Copying of protected ex-
pression. 92 Copyright ownership is usually established by proving re-
gistration.93 Copying can be inferred through circumstantial evidence
of access, if the works are "substantially similar. ' 94 Unauthorized
copying constitutes copyright infringement subject to civil and crimi-
nal liability.95
Certain uses which works otherwise constitute infringement are
within the statutory fair use defense. 96 To the extent there is a reason-
able licensing procedure available, however, copying without a readily
available license may not be deemed fair use.97 Licensing programs
are available through the Copyright Clearance Center 98 and UMI Ar-
ticle Clearing House for printed material and through BMI and AS-
CAP99 for music.
Recent controversies have required the courts to apply copyright
law to Internet use and peer-to-peer file transfer technologies.100 One
Arizona corporation agreed to a $1 million out of court settlement
with Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA"), resulting
from employee use of a corporate file server to distribute MP3 files
over the Internet. 01 The RIAA recently sent a warning letter to For-
91 17 U.S.C. § 106.
92 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). See also
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1184 (1995); registration is prima facie evidence of copyright ownership and valid-
ity. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Civil remedies for copyright infringement include injunctive relief
(§ 502), damages (§ 504) and costs and attorneys fees (§ 505).
93 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir.
1989).
94 Apple, 35 F.3d at 1442.
95 See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995) (civil liability for duplication of published scientific articles).
See also supra note 11.
96 17 U.S.C. § 107.
97 See American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 913.
98 www.copyright.com.
99 www.bmi.com, www.ascap.org.
100 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in
part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d
294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com,
Inc., 92 F.Supp. 2d 349, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376 (S.D. N.Y. 2000). See also David Goldstone &
Michael O'Leary, Novel Criminal Copyright Infringement Issues Related to the Internet, US
ATrORNEY'S BULLETIN (May 2001), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/usamay2001_
5.htm.
101 RIAA Collects $1 Million From Company Running Internal Server Offering
Thousands Of Songs (April 9, 2002), available at http://www.riaa.org/news/newsletter/
040902_2.asp.
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tune 1000 companies and 2000 University presidents regarding use of
powerful network computers to support illegal "warez" sites that
share copyrighted software, music and video. 02 Corporations can be
held liable for vicarious or contributory copyright infringement based
on the conduct of employees. 10 3
Software industry groups, such as the Business Software Alliance,
have been formed to combat software piracy. The Sixth Annual Busi-
ness Software Alliance Global Software Piracy Study estimated world-
wide software piracy losses at $11.75 billion in 2000 (one third of all
business software applications). 10 4 These organizations are increasing
their efforts to combat software piracy, both domestically and
internationally.
1. Criminal Prosecution for Copyright Infringement
To prove misdemeanor copyright infringement: the prosecution
must show: (1) that someone other than the defendant owned the cop-
yright at issue; and (2) that the defendant violated one or [sic] more of
the copyright owner's exclusive rights under Section 106.105
Although willful copyright infringement for profit has technically
been a misdemeanor since 1909, there have been few prosecutions.
Until 1992, only copyright infringements involving sound record-
ings or motion pictures constituted felonies (punishable by more than
one year in jail). Software Publishers Association ("SPA," now
known as Software and Information Industry Association) was active
in obtaining legislation (PL 102-561) expanding criminal penalties to
cover any copyrighted work, including software. To prove felony cop-
yright infringement, "the defendant must have violated the copyright
owner's reproduction or distribution right; mere violation of the right
of adaptation (preparation of derivative works), public performance,
or public display is not enough. '10 6 The felony criminal sanctions
were originally imposed only if the infringement was committed "will-
102 John Borland, Studios, RIAA Warn CEOs on File Trading, CNET News.corn (Oct.
24, 2002), available at http://zdnet.com.com/2102-1106-963208.html; John Borland,
Hollywood Chases Down Campus Pirates, CNET News.com Oct. 10, 2002 available at
http://zdnet.com.com/2102-1106-961637.html.
103 Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996); CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loop-
Net, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001).
104 SIXTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY 2 (May 2001), available at
www.bsa.org/resources200l-05.21.55.pdf.
105 JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL CREATIVE AND
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 13.04[1][a], (1994-2003).
106 Id.
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fully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain." 0 7
In enacting the enhanced criminal penalties, Congress recognized
that the term "willfully," although used in copyright statutes since
1897 for criminal violations, has never been defined. 108
Making at least ten copies of a copyrighted work, with a retail
value of more than $2,500, during a six-month period, is required for a
felony. 10 9 In determining the threshold for felony copyright
infringement:
The term "retail value" is deliberately undefined, since in most
cases it will represent the price at which the work is sold through
normal retail channels ... In [appropriate] cases, the courts may
look for the suggested retail price, the wholesale price, the replace-
ment cost of the item, or financial injury costs of the copyright
owner.
110
In U.S. v. Manzer,111 the defendant was ordered to pay $2.7 mil-
lion in restitution after a criminal conviction and was also required to
pay a civil judgment of $2 million. Software companies and their po-
licing organizations are actively encouraging United States Attorneys
to pursue wrongdoers aggressively. In the last four years, over 30
cases of criminal copyright infringement have been prosecuted.112
2. Prosecution Under the No Electronic Theft Act of 1997
In a well-publicized case, a student posting software on the In-
ternet caused over $1 million in damage but did not commit a crime
because the student did not intend to profit from his conduct.1 13 The
No Electronic Theft ("NET") Act eliminated the requirement of
"commercial advantage or private financial gain" by substituting
107 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). Use or removal of a copyright notice with fraudulent intent, or
knowingly making a false representation of material fact in a copyright registration appli-
cation shall result in a fine of not more than $2,500. 17 U.S.C. § 506(c)-(e).
108 H.R.REP. No. 102-997 at 5 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3573. See U.S.
v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222 (8th Cir. 1995) (copyright notice in program read through use of a
common debug program or "DUMP" file sufficient to prove willful infringement).
109 Felony copyright infringement is subject to imprisonment for not more than five
years and a fine of up to $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for corporations. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2319(b)(1), 3571. Enhanced penalties for repeat offenders extend to 10 years imprison-
ment. In January 2001, a domain name (www.software-inc.com) was forfeited in connec-
tion with a guilty plea for unauthorized sale of computer software. 61 PTCJ 260 (1/12/01).
110 H.R.REP. No. 102-997, at 6-7 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3574-75. See
U.S. v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 674 (2nd Cir. 1992) (using the normal retail price rather
than the lower bootlegged price paid for illegitimate copies).
111 69 F.3d 222 (8th Cir. 1995).
112 www.cybercrime.gov/ipcases.htm (chart of cases). These cases include NET Act and
DMCA cases, see part 2 and 3 infra.
113 United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F.Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
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proof of reproduction or distribution of one or more copyrighted
works with a total retail value of over $1000 in a 180 day period.114
This change allows prosecution of bulletin board operators who will-
fully copy and distribute works (typically software) worth more than
$1,000.
On November 23, 1999, a 22-year-old Oregon college student,
Jeffrey Levy, pled guilty posting software, videos and music to his
Web site. 15 This was the first conviction under the NET Act. In
2001, seventeen "Pirates with Attitude" (5 former Intel employees
and 12 others), were indicted under the NET Act in Chicago. 116 On
May 15, 2001, after 13 defendants had plead guilty to copyright con-
spiracy, one defendant was convicted at the first trial under the NET
Act. 117 By October 2002, Operation Buccaneer resulted in 16 felony
copyright infringement convictions in the United States with
sentences imposed of up to 46 months in federal prison. 18
3. The Impact of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
a. Safe Harbors for Internet Service Providers
Potential liability for copyright infringement has been seen as an
impediment to the growth of electronic commerce. Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs")119 can now be shielded from liability for damages
arising from copyright infringement if they register with the U.S. Cop-
yright Office and designate an agent to receive notifications of
claimed infringement. 120 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
114 PL 105-147. 111 Stat. 2678. See also 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)-(2).
115 U.S. Dep't of Justice press release, First Criminal Conviction Under the "No Elec-
tronic Theft" (NET) Act for Unlawful Distribution of Software on the Internet (Aug. 20,
1999), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/netconv.htm.
116 Darryl van Duch, Eyes on 'Pirates' Trial in Chicago Can Prosecutors Succeed if De-
fendants Didn't Gain Financially, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 26, 2001; U.S. Dep't of Justice press
release, U.S. Indicts 17 in Alleged International Software Piracy Conspiracy (May 4, 2000),
at http://www.cybercrime.gov/pirates.htm.
117 U.S. Dep't of Justice press release, Software Pirates Guilty of Copyright Infringement
Under NET Act (May 15, 2001), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/pwa-verdict.htm; Business
Software Alliance press release, First Guilty Verdict Under NET Act Draws Praise (May
15, 2001), at http://www.bsa.org/usa/press/newsreleases/2001-05-15.553.phtml.
118 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Operation Buccaneer (last updated Oct. 7, 2002), at http://
www.cybercrime.gov/ob/OBMain.htm.
119 "A service provider generally includes an entity offering the transmission, routing or
connections for digital online communications, [including (except for transmission without
modification)] a "provider of online services or network access, or the operator of the
facilities therefore." 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1). The broad definition will include many compa-
nies providing Internet access.
120 A summary of the regulations is available on the Library of Congress website at
http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/onlinesp/. See Annot. 2001 ALR Fed.2 (Validity, Construc-
tion and Application of DMCA).
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("DMCA") 12t limits the copyright owner to injunctive relief (removal
of the infringing material) against an ISP unless the ISP: (1) initially
placed the material on-line; (2) generates, selects, or alters the content
of the material; (3) determines the recipients of the material; (4) re-
ceives a financial benefit directly attributable to a particular act of
infringement; (5) sponsors, endorses, or advertises the material; or (6)
knows, or is aware by notice or other information indicating that the
material is infringing.
ISPs are generally protected if they merely operate as a conduit
("transmission ... without modification"),122 if material provided by a
third party is automatically cached,12 3 or if the ISP stores or links to
infringing material without knowledge of the infringement or a finan-
cial benefit attributable to the infringing activity. 2 4 The ISP must
adopt, implement and notify subscribers of a termination policy for
repeat infringers. 125 Knowledge is imputed if the ISP is, "aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent". 126
The ISP must "respond expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, material" made available online by a person other than the service
provider "that is claimed to be infringing"' 27 in order to claim, the
exemptions for (1) system caching 28 and (2) lack of benefit and con-
trol.129 Even if the material or activity is ultimately determined not to
be infringing, an ISP is not liable for disabling access to or removing
material in a good faith response to: (1) a notice of infringement 130 or
(2) "facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is appar-
121 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304; (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 1201 - 05).
122 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
123 Id. § 512(b).
124 Id. § 512(c)-(d).
125 The service provider must adopt, implement and inform subscribers of a policy that
provides for termination of repeat infringers and accommodates "standard technical mea-
sures." Standard technical measures means technical measures used by copyright owners
to identify or protect copyrighted works that have: (1) developed "pursuant to a broad
consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-
industry standards process"; (2) are available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms;
and (3) do not impose "substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on
their systems or networks". Id. § 512(i).
126 § 512 (d)(1)(B).
127 § 512(b)(1), § 512(b)(2)(E).
128 § 512(b)(1), § 512(b)(2)(E).
129 § 512(c)(1)(c), § 512(d)(3).
130 The registrar of copyrights maintains a current directory of designed agents for re-
ceipt of notice. See http://www.loc.gov.copyright/onlinesp. The designation must be accom-
panied by a $20 fee. See 37 CFR 201.38.
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ent".131 Substantial compliance with the notice provision is
sufficient. 132
The ISP must "take reasonable steps promptly to notify the sub-
scriber that it has removed or disabled access to the material. ' 133 The
source of the material can than have access reinstated by serving a
counter notification. The ISPs replacement or removal of disabled
material in response to a counter notification will not subject the ISP
to liability for copyright infringement.134
No obligation is imposed on ISPs to seek information indicating
materials infringe. Liability for direct infringement against a passive
service provider is precluded by the legislative history of the DMCA,
but the ISP can be liable for contributory infringement after receiving
actual or constructive notice under the DMCA. 135 Cases such as Play-
boy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc.136 would still result in liability
for website operators who sell infringing material and profit from the
infringement-even in the form of a fixed monthly fee. Peer to peer
distribution of copyrighted material does not meet the safe harbors
available under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.137
EBay and its employees have been held immune from liability
under the DMCA safe harbor provisions. 138 The same District Court
recently held that America Online was also within the safe harbor
provision, 139 but an adult website age verification service was not.140
b. Civil Liability
The DMCA technically does not define "copyright infringe-
ment." Instead the DMCA creates liability in "a niche distinct from
131 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1).
132 ALS Scan Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001) (ISP could
be liable for failure to take down infringing photographs by 2 news groups).
133 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A).
134 Id. § 512(g)(4).
135 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001).
136 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
137 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd
in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), on remand, 2001 WL 227083 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001)
(Judge Patel ordered Napster to remove songs identified by the plaintiffs within 3 days);
Thomas E. Barako, Finding... Liability, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (2001).
138 Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (the copyright
owner did not comply with the requirements of the statutory written notice).
139 Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp.2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
140 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 2002 WL 731721 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22,
2002); See Costar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001) (genuine
issues of material fact found to exist regarding protection under the DMCA).
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copyright infringement". 141 The impact of the DMCA on copyright
related issues, however, merits discussion.
The DMCA prohibits manufacturing or trafficking in any tech-
nology, product, service or device primarily designed: (1) for the pur-
pose of circumventing a technological measure to control access to a
protected work (i.e. descrambling a scrambled work, decrypting an
encrypted work), 142 or (2) for the purpose of circumventing copy pro-
tection 143 afforded by a technological measure.1 44 Opponents argued
the provision against circumventing copy protection would limit the
statutory fair use doctrine and prevent access to material not pro-
tected by copyright. A variety of exemptions to the prohibition on
circumventing technological measures are contained in the statute.
1 45
In addition, the DMCA provides that no person shall provide
false copyright management information 146 or intentionally remove or
alter any copyright management information. 147 Copyright manage-
ment information includes: (1) the title and other information identi-
fying the work; (2) the name and other identifying information about
the author, (3) the copyright owner, or the performer; (4) the terms
and conditions for use of the work or such other information as the
Register of Copyrights may prescribe by regulation.' 48 Again, certain
exemptions are provided, for example, to preserve fair use 149 to insure
that the design or selection of components for any consumer electron-
ics, telecommunications or computer product does not need to "pro-
vide for a response to any particular technology measure" 150 and to
protect privacy. 151
Civil libertarians have argued that the DMCA goes too far in pro-
tecting the rights of copyright owners. 152 The fair use defense (17
141 RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000),
(quoting 1 NIMMER COPYRIGHT § 12.A17[B].)
142 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2003).
143 Copy protection is used here as shorthand for protection of all rights of the copyright
owner under 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003).
144 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (2003). See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL
127311 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
145 In October 2000, the Copyright Office granted additional exemptions from liability
for circumventing a technological measure to control access to 2 classes of works: compila-
tions of websites blocked by filtering software; and access control mechanisms failing due
to malfunction, damage or obsolescence. 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(1)(2). For other matters
circumvention of access control measures exposes the user to infringement liability.
146 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1).
147 Id. § 1202(b)(1).
148 Id. § 1202(c)(1)-(4), (6), (8).
149 Id. § 107.
150 Id. § 1201(c)(3).
151 Id. § 1201(i).
152 See e.g. ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND, at http://www.eff.org.
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U.S.C. § 107) applies only to copyright infringement, not violations of
the DMCA anticircumvention provisions. 153
A Princeton professor claims he elected not to present his re-
search into the secure digital music initiative (SDMI) copyright pro-
tection technology due to threats of a lawsuit. The professor filed a
declaratory judgment action to establish his right to publicize his re-
search. 154 Again, overbroad potential liability is viewed as detrimen-
tal to the growth of electronic commerce and related research.
c. Criminal Liability
Criminal penalties apply to the manufacture of devices to circum-
vent data management and database protection systems. 155 A crimi-
nal proceeding must be commenced within 5 years after the cause of
action arose. 156
The argument over the scope of the DMCA intensified when a
Russian citizen, Dmitry Sklyarov, was arrested while attending a con-
vention in Las Vegas. 157 Mr. Skyarov allegedly authored software that
decrypts security measures on e-book Reader software provided by
Adobe Systems. His employer ElcomSoft failed to respond to cease
and desist letters from Adobe. He was arrested the day after he gave
a speech on electronic book security at the Defcon Hackers Confer-
ence. Mr. Skyarov became the first person indicted under the DMCA
in Northern California on August 28, 2001 along with his employer. 158
Interestingly, Adobe Systems withdrew support for the prosecution
prior to the indictment because on the software was no longer availa-
153 Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd,
273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001).
154 Felten v. Recording Industry Association of America, No. CV-01-2669 (GEB) (D.
NJ June 6, 2001).
155 A violation, if willful and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain, results in a fine of not more than $500,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years
for a first offense. Those penalties are doubled for any subsequent offense. The criminal
sanctions do not apply to a non-profit library, archive or educational institution. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1204 (2003).
156 Id.
157 Brenda Sandberg, FBI Arrest of Russian Developer May Trigger Copyright Fight,
THE RECORDER (California), July 20, 2001. See U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111
(N.D. Cal. 2002).
158 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, First Indictment Under Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act Returned Against Russian National, Company, in San Jose, California
(Aug. 28, 2001), available at www.cybercrimes.gov/sklyarovindictment.htm. The first per-
son was convicted under the DMCA in Nebraska in 2002. See Press Release, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, First Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Criminal Conviction in
California and Second Known DMCA Conviction in the Country (Mar. 28, 2002) (availa-
ble at http://www.cybercrime.gove/mynofplea.htm).
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ble in the U.S. 159 Defenses based on free speech and fair use have
been rejected by the District Court,160 but the prosecution was unable
to establish the requisite criminal intent in the trial of Elcom late last
year.
In February 2003, federal prosecutors seized a website used to
distribute mod chips designed to circumvent security features in the
Microsoft XBox and Sony Playstation 2 game consoles. The prosecu-
tion asserted violation of the DMCA anticircumvention provisions.
The site content was replaced with information about prosecution of
online piracy under the terms of a plea agreement. 161
Congressional leaders recently sent a letter to the Department of
Justice urging criminal enforcement to deter peer-to-peer online theft
of copyrighted works. The letter asserts prosecution is appropriate to
protect the copyright based industries, which account for 5% of
GDP.162 Political pressure to deter copying of software, music and
videos can be expected to continue. Continued prosecution based on
legislation already enacted is inevitable.
4. Protection of Performers' Rights and Data Bases
There is now a statute criminalizing unauthorized fixation of live
musical performances. 163 Other proposed legislation which would
provide criminal penalties for use of proprietary databases has not yet
been enacted in the United States. 164 Pressure will continue to ex-
pand protection of databases under U.S. law.
159 Copyrights: Arrangement Delayed as Opposing Lawyers Negotiate in Russian
Software Case PTD, August, 27, 2001at d2.
160 U.S. v. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
161 See, 20 COMPUTER AND INTERNET LAWYER 30 (May 2003); www.iSONEWS.com
(now linking to www.cybercrimes.gov). Cf. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Compo-
nents, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D.Ky. 2003)(civil liability analysis under DMCA);
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 2003 WL 22038638 (N.D.Ill. Aug
29, 2003)(same).
162 Letters from Joseph Biden, Denator, Chairman of Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime and Drug, et al., to John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice (July
25, 2002) (available at http://www.politechbot.com/docs/congress.p2p.letter.081002.pdf).
163 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1982). See, U.S. v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999),
reh'g. denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000).
164 A Directive on Legal Protection of Databases became effective for the European
Union in 1998. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament of the Council of 11 March
1996 (available at http://europe.eu.int/eurlex/enlif/det/1996en 396L0009.html). The Coun-
cil of Europe also adopted a convention on cybercrime (ETS No. 185) which would govern
production of information from Internet service providers, the collection of Internet con-
tent and the extradition of cybercriminals. (available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/
EN/cadreprincipal.htm).
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5. Prosecution Under State Law
State copyright legislation is preempted by federal law. 165 Pre-
emption, however, does not bar a state law conviction for destroying
data through use of a "time bomb" installed in computer software. 166
Thus a Wisconsin statute criminalizing willful destruction of computer
data was upheld.167 Copyright law does not preempt criminal prose-
cution for destruction of noncopyrighted data owned by the victim.
Commentators have argued that virtually every state has imposed a
computer crimes law that may permit state court prosecution in mat-
ters potentially subject to federal copyright preemption. 168
II.
DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PLAN To PREVENT,
DETECT AND MITIGATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFENSES.
1 6 9
A. Criminal Corporate Liability
The risk of a business inadvertently receiving and using stolen
property is greatly enhanced by the nature of intellectual property. A
company may not easily be able to detect that an employee is using
information that he or she misappropriated from another company.
In addition to the significant civil liabilities that have traditionally re-
sulted from an infringement or misappropriation of another's intellec-
tual property, 70 today a business may also be criminally prosecuted
and sentenced.
Criminal liability is a serious threat to a company with a rogue
employee. Under federal law, a corporation may be held criminally
liable for the illegal acts of an employee, regardless of the employee's
position within the corporation,1 71 if the employee's actions: (i) were
within the scope of his duties, and (ii) were intended, at least in part,
165 17 U.S.C. § 301. NBA v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); See also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); State v. Perry, 697 N.E.2d 624
(Ohio 1998).
166 Corcoran v. Sullivan, 112 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1997).
167 Id.
168 See Note, Corcoran v. Sullivan, 13 BERKLEY TECH. L. J., 55 at 64 nn.71-73 (1998)
(citing Xan Raskin & Jeannie Schaldach-Pavia, l1th Survey of White-Collar Crime: Com-
puter Crimes 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 541 (1996)).
169 For a discussion of Arizona corporate compliance planning, see James Burgess &
Lee Stein, Carrots, Sticks and Criminal Penalties, ARIZONA ATORNEY, Feb. 2001, at 30-35.
170 See, e.g., Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340 (D.
Mass. 1993) ($24,417,000 jury award for misappropriation of trade secrets; judge increased
this award by $9,000,000 for willfulness), affid. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
171 New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491-95 (1909);
United States v. Route 2, Box 472, 60 F.3d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding corporation
liable for acts of one of its agents committed in scope of employment); United States v.
Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (same).
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to benefit the corporation. 172 Under Arizona law, a corporation may
be held criminally liable for conduct undertaken on its behalf if the
offense was "engaged in, authorized... or recklessly tolerated by the
directors of the enterprise in any manner or by a high managerial
agent acting within the scope of employment.' '1 73
The illegal knowledge or intent necessary for many felony viola-
tions can be inferred from the collective conduct of the company's
executives and employees.' 74 The corporation does not need to profit
from its employee's illegal conduct to be held liable.175 Even though
an employee was acting primarily to benefit himself, the corporation
may be criminally liable if any part of his motivation was to benefit
the corporation. 176
Businesses that fail to take the steps necessary to prevent and
detect intellectual property offenses are subjecting themselves to an
unnecessary risk of criminal prosecution and penalties, as well as civil
liability.
Effective programs to prevent or detect violations are specifically
recognized as a mitigating factor under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines.177 If the government prosecutes or the victim sues, the existence
of an effective compliance plan may mitigate the assessment of crimi-
nal penalties 78 and undermine any punitive damage claims based on
willful misconduct. 179
172 United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238 (1982); United States v. One Parcel of Land,
965 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1992) (agent's knowledge of illegal act may be imputed to
corporation if agent was "acting as authorized and motivated at least in part by an intent to
benefit the corporation.").
173 A.R.S. § 13-305(A)(2).
174 Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 855 (imputing to corporation various employees'
collective knowledge obtained within the scope of their employment).
175 United States v. American Medical Laboratories, 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
176 Automated Medical Laboratories, 770 F.2d at 407 (affirming corporation's convic-
tion for actions of subsidiary's employee despite claim that employee was acting for his
own benefit, namely his desire to ascend the corporate ladder; "Partucci was clearly acting
in part to benefit AML since his advancement within the corporation depended on AML's
well-being and its lack of difficulties with the FDA.").
177 18 USCS Appx. § 8A1.2 (2003). See id. § 2B5.3.
178 United States Sentencing Comm'n, 18 USCS Appx. § 8C2.5 (providing for signifi-
cantly reduced criminal fines if corporate defendant had "an effective program to prevent
and detect violations of law," i.e. a compliance plan); A.R.S. § 13-822 (providing for a 25%
reduction in criminal fines if corporate defendant had an effective compliance plan).
179 Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (employer may not be vicari-
ously liable in punitive damages for discriminatory employment decisions of managers
when those decisions are contrary to employer's good-faith efforts to comply with anti-
discrimination laws).
Fall 2003]
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL
B. Compliance Planning
1. Establish Compliance Standards Through a Code of Conduct
Generally, a company's Code of Conduct should inform employ-
ees that they must respect the copyrights, patents, licenses, trade
secrets and confidential information of others, including the com-
pany's competitors, suppliers, and customers. The Code should pro-
vide enough information so that employees will be able to recognize
potential problems. The Code should also direct employees as to
where they can obtain further guidance if they are concerned about
how to handle a particular issue or how to avoid a potential violation.
The Code of Conduct should educate employees about how to
avoid violations that may occur because of the nature of the com-
pany's business. For instance, a company that uses software under li-
censes from other companies should: (1) inventory the licenses and
review the restrictions they impose, and (2) use the Code of Conduct
to educate employees about the company's restrictions under the li-
censes. The Code of Conduct may discuss the restrictions the
software licenses impose. Alternatively, if the company does not want
its Code of Conduct to go into that level of detail, the Code may sim-
ply state that all software must be licensed, that such licenses restrict
the company's use of software, and that employees can take specific
steps to obtain more information from specific sources about what
they can and cannot do under the licenses.
The Code of Conduct should emphasize that employees have a
duty to report any questionable conduct, that such reporting will be
kept in confidence to the extent possible, and that employees will not
suffer any detriment or retaliation for reporting a potential violation
in good faith. 180
2. Communicate the Compliance Standards Effectively
Producing a Code of Conduct is of little value unless employees
understand what conduct is required of them. The company must
train all employees in what the standards mean. With respect to intel-
lectual property issues, the training should provide employees with a
basic understanding of trade secrets, patents, copyrights and other
forms of intellectual property. The training should raise employees'
awareness of misappropriation of intellectual property, especially for
180 Anne C. Flannery & Kristine Zaleskas, The Case for Implementing a Corporate
Compliance Program, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Feb. 1998, at 4.
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employees who formerly worked for competitors. 181 The training pro-
gram should use examples to illustrate how the standards apply to spe-
cific workplace situations. The goal should be to train each employee
to identify ethical and compliance problems and to seek appropriate
assistance in resolving such issues.
3. Establish Procedures to Achieve Compliance, Including
Monitoring and Regular Audits
An effective compliance plan requires that a company establish:
(1) avenues by which employees can report potential compliance
problems; (2) procedures for the company to investigate reports of
potential violations, and if necessary, take remedial action; and (3)
procedures by which the company will regularly monitor and test its
compliance program to make sure it is working as it should.
A company should establish specific procedures designed to pre-
vent employees from misappropriating confidential information from
other companies or infringing on patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
a. Preventing Misappropriation of Confidential Information
A company faces a heightened risk of being accused of trade se-
cret misappropriation when it hires employees who formerly worked
for competitors or whose prior employers utilized written confidenti-
ality agreements. In interviewing job applicants, a company should
require the applicants to disclose whether they signed a non-disclo-
sure, non-compete or confidentiality agreement with any of their for-
mer employers. If they did, the company should require them to
provide the agreement so that the company can ascertain what restric-
tions apply. A company should not hire an employee who cannot per-
form the new position's duties without violating the rights of a former
employer. All new hires should be required to sign a statement ac-
knowledging that they understand that the company does not want
them to disclose any confidential information they obtained from for-
mer employers. 182
A company should monitor new hires closely, especially if they
formerly worked in a position where they could have taken confiden-
tial information that would be of use in their new position. Also, a
company should apprise appropriate employees of confidentiality pro-
visions in the company's agreements with vendors or suppliers, and
181 Stanley S. Arkin & Michael Colosi, The Criminalization of Theft of Technology and
Trade Secrets, 5 BUSINESS CRIMES BULLETIN: COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION, June 1996, at
4.
182 Alan J. Sternstein et al., Designing an Effective Intellectual Property Compliance Pro-
gram, § 3:132, in 8 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES (West 1998).
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monitor employees' adherence to those confidentiality provisions. If
a company accepts advice or ideas from external sources, it should
establish idea submission procedures to protect itself from those who
might submit an idea and later claim that the company stole it.183
When an employee terminates his or her employment, the com-
pany should conduct an exit interview. Ask the employee whether he
or she is aware of any potential misappropriation of confidential infor-
mation or other violations by the company. Document the em-
ployee's answers and investigate any reported potential violations.
b. Preventing Patent InfringementI84
To avoid liability for patent infringement, a company should es-
tablish a review process for all new products and improvements to
existing products, and new processes and equipment used to manufac-
ture products.18 5 The review should occur before the new develop-
ment is made, used or sold. The review should determine whether the
new development infringes on an existing patent. The review may in-
clude conducting a patent search and obtaining an opinion from pat-
ent counsel if any infringement issues need to be addressed.
c. Preventing Trademark Infringement
To avoid infringing on the trademark rights of others, a company
should establish a review process for each mark the company contem-
plates using. 186 The review should include state and federal trade-
mark searches to determine whether the mark is registerable and
available for use. The company's trademark counsel should evaluate
any marks listed in the search reports to determine whether the pro-
posed mark might infringe them by being confusingly similar.
d. Preventing Copyright Infringement
A common source of copyright liability is use of unlicensed
software. At least two industry groups (BSA and SIIA) actively pur-
sue enforcement of copyright protection of member software provid-
ers. Both provide sample compliance policies and employee
notices. 18 7
Use of the Internet has accelerated copyright risks for software and
183 Sternstein, supra n. 177 § 3:132.
184 There are no statutes specifically criminalizing patent infringement. DRATLER, IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
§ 13.04 (1999).
185 Sternstein, supra n. 177 § 3:122.
186 Sternstein, supra n. 177 § 1:13.
187 www.siia.net/privacy.html, www.bsa.org/usa/policy/privacy/.
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website content. Employers should monitor employee Internet use
and notify employees they are subject to monitoring.
4. If an offense is detected, take all reasonable steps to respond
appropriately and prevent future offenses.
If a company discovers unlawful conduct, it must take all reasona-
ble steps to remedy the violation. In addition to disciplining the em-
ployees involved, the company may need to make restitution to
anyone injured by the unlawful conduct, report the conduct to law
enforcement or other government agencies, and modify its compliance
plan to prevent similar recurrences in the future.
The value of self-reporting and taking remedial measures is illus-
trated by a recent prosecution under the Economic Espionage Act.188
David Kern joined Radiological Associates of Sacramento ("RAS")
after he was fired from his job at Varian Medical Systems. RAS was a
customer of Varian. According to court documents, Kern allegedly
stole information after a Varian technician accidentally left a laptop
computer at a hospital. Kern's co-workers reported the suspected
theft to RAS's management, which in turn disclosed it to Varian.
Varian sued Kern, but not RAS, and was awarded $3.5 million. Fed-
eral prosecutors also criminally charged Kern under the Economic Es-
pionage Act. Kern is awaiting trial and faces a prison term of up to
ten years.
RAS's disclosure paid off. It avoided the $3.5 million liability in
the suit Varian brought for theft of the trade secret information. RAS
also avoided criminal prosecution under the Economic Espionage
Act.
III.
CONCLUSION
Businesses that depend on intellectual property to compete (vir-
tually all businesses) risk corporate criminal liability if an employee
misappropriates intellectual property belonging to others. Today's le-
gal climate demands that businesses establish compliance programs to
prevent their employees from infringing or misappropriating others'
intellectual property, and to detect and remedy such offenses if they
do occur. An effective compliance plan serves these functions and is a
company's best investment to protect against criminal and civil
liability.
188 See Torri Still, A Lesson for the Valley: Thou Shalt Not Steal, THE RECORDER, Oct.
7. 1999.
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